Recent work has begun exploring the effects of foreign military deployments on host-state foreign policies. However, research mostly focuses on dyadic relationships between major powers and host-states, ignoring the broader regional security environment of host-states. We develop a theory of spatial hierarchies to understand how security relationships throughout the region surrounding the host-state affect host-state foreign policy. Using data on US military deployments from 1950-2005, we show that regional security considerations condition how hoststates respond to the deployment of military forces to their territory. Consequently, regional analyses are fundamental in understanding monadic and dyadic decisions about security, alliance behavior, and conflict.
states' defense spending decisions. Studies typically focus on the host-state's response to US troop deployments in a dyadic fashion, evaluating how US deployments affect the host-state's military spending or conflict propensity (for example, Allen et al. 2014; Lake 2009a; Martínez Machain and Morgan 2013) . This approach assumes that the effects of US military deployments on a particular state are independent of military deployments in neighboring states and the regional security environment.
Nevertheless, there are reasons to suspect that the effects of host-state and regional deployments are not independent (Lake 2009b) . The United States deploys military forces to shape the foreign policy decisions of countries around the host-state, as much as the host-state itself. Schelling (1966:47) notes that US troop deployments to West Germany and Berlin were intended to affect the decisions of the USSR. Brown (2013 Brown ( , 2014 also notes that the actions of third-party states shape the negotiations over troop deployments. Furthermore, recent work by Lake (2009a:152-153) suggests that security and economic relations between the United States and subordinate states should affect the interactions of third-party dyads. To understand how a host-state responds to military deployments by a major power, we must consider the deployments in the region surrounding the host-state.
This research provides us with greater insight into how the US-structured relationships with states conditions-and is conditioned by-similar relationships within a state's neighborhood. World politics is replete with these complex relationships, but scholars often shy away from directly modeling them. As our research shows, a range of regional security considerations affect decisions concerning something as basic as a state's defense expenditures; we cannot understand how much a state spends on its own security by viewing the state in isolation from other factors such as its regional security environment and relationships with major powers. These factors jointly condition the referent state's domestic and international decisions. The basic security concept of defense provision is as fundamental as it is illustrative: Scholars ought to connect the understanding of system characteristics (polarity), major power behavior, and regional context to understand when some configurations are permissive while others are restrictive. While traditional schools of international relations assert that survival is paramount and power is instrumental to survival, our article shows that these expectations are conditional. Though we focus on defense spending, this interconnectivity is pervasive throughout world politics. Wherever we find differences in monadic, dyadic, regional, and global norms or regimes, we should expect to see these processes.
The findings of the conditional effect of troop deployments also gives scholars more information in understanding both the institutions of global hierarchy and the practical implications of US security commitments. Since the end of the Cold War, policymakers and scholars alike have debated the implications of US deployments to Western Europe (for example, Germany), Asia (for example, South Korea and Japan), and the Middle East (for example, Saudi Arabia and Iraq). During the writing of this manuscript, there are active debates concerning increasing US troop commitments to the Middle East as well as the Baltic states. These deployments have implications for the neighboring region. For example, understanding Lithuania's response to a US decision to increase security commitments to that country (or to Estonia or Latvia) is easier to understand when we evaluate the regional security commitments the United States has to other states in Europe. Simply evaluating Lithuanian defense expenditures purely in the US-Lithuanian dyad, or just Lithuanian expenditures relative to its neighbors, insufficiently explains Lithuania's behavior.
More narrowly, we offer two contributions to our understanding of how US troop deployments influence host-state defense spending. First, considering the interplay between major powers' deployments to a state and deployments to neighboring third-party states yields valuable theoretical insights into states' foreign policy choices. Leaders' foreign policy decisions are not independent of the decisions made by the leaders of other states. Second, we utilize spatial measurement techniques to evaluate the theoretical implications of our argument. We find that the effect of US military deployments on host-states' defense spending is contingent upon whether third-party states in the neighboring region also host US deployments. We also find that the nature of the host-state's relationship with the United States conditions how the host-state responds to US deployments.
Security, troop deployments, and host-state foreign policy
Theoretical work concerning the trade-offs states make between sovereignty/ autonomy and security establishes the basis for previous scholarship on the relationship between military deployments and host-state foreign policy.
1 Lake (1999; 2001; 2009a; 2009b) argues that state sovereignty is a flexible concept that fluctuates temporally and spatially. States can trade away components of their sovereignty in exchange for economic and security-based side-payments. Such trade-offs often occur in asymmetric power relationships where a weaker state offers up some particularistic good to a more powerful state in exchange for the latter's guarantees of security. For example, in signing an alliance treaty, a weak state may cede control over its foreign policy to a more powerful state in exchange for protection (Morrow 1991) .
Some scholars argue that such security-autonomy exchanges characterize US foreign policy during the post-war period (Lake 1999 (Lake , 2009a (Lake , 2009b Ikenberry 2011) . The United States has established security relationships 1 We use the terms "sovereignty" and "autonomy" interchangeably.
with states characterized by varying degrees of hierarchical control and subordination. In exchange for ceding autonomy over their foreign policy to the United States, states receive enhanced security from the United States. The nature of these policy swaps leads to the formation of contractual hierarchical relationships between the United States and other states. Organizations like NATO, which contains a structure that has a lower level of coercion and a higher level of equality among participants, are relatively anarchic arrangements, although the United States does still try to wield some influence over NATO allies' foreign policies (Lake 2009b) . Alternatively, United States relations with Japan and many Latin American countries represent more hierarchical arrangements (Lake 1999 (Lake , 2001 . States that cede more sovereignty to the United States are more subordinate states in the hierarchical relationship. Like Lake's (1999 Lake's ( , 2009a Lake's ( , 2009b concept of sovereignty, Morrow (1991:909) argues that a security-autonomy trade-off characterizes alliance relationships, where a state's autonomy is a function of its capabilities and alliance relationships. Greater power disparities should produce alliances where one state cedes foreign policy autonomy in exchange for security from the more powerful state, whereas smaller power disparities may produce mutual gains in the production of security for both states.
The empirical implications of this theoretical logic concern how security ties with a major power affects the subordinate state's foreign policymaking. The more hierarchical a relationship, the more constrained a subordinate state's foreign policy behavior becomes. Scholars have used US troop deployments as a proxy for the magnitude of this security-autonomy trade-off. The more troops the United States deploys to a state, the more security the United States provides for that state, and the more sovereignty the host-state cedes to the United States. Statistical analyses support the expectation that this loss of autonomy translates into smaller host-state militaries. Lake (2009a) find that subordinate states reduce their defense burden as the size of US military deployments relative to the host-state population increases. Martínez Machain and Morgan (2013) also find that larger deployments correlate with smaller host-state militaries in terms of personnel. Lastly, US military deployments correlate with improved human rights practices by some host-state governments (Bell, Clay and Martinez Machain Forthcoming) . Building on this work, Allen et al. (2014) argue that the effect of military deployments on security trade-offs depends on the size of the deployments, but also on power disparities and the institutional context of security relationships between the United States and subordinate states. They find that for many states there is a negative relationship between the size of US troop deployments and the hoststate's defense burden. However, members of NATO actually increase expenditures as the United States deploys more troops. Allen et al. (2014) also examine the effects of regional US troop deployments on states' defense spending. The authors note that security relationships are often established with an eye toward the broader regional security environment surrounding a given state. They argue that deployments in the region should exert a negative effect on defense spending that is similar to the negative effect of direct deployments to the host-state itself. If states give up autonomy in exchange for the security provided by troop deployments, it follows that this dynamic should apply to states neighboring the host-state, as well as to the host-state itself. The authors argue that larger regional military deployments surrounding a state indicate that the neighbors surrounding the state are more constrained in their foreign policy behavior by the United States. When a given state's neighbors are all mutually constrained by their hierarchical relations with a major power, we should expect that state to have less need of a large military. However, the results of their analysis contradict this theoretical expectation-as regional deployments correlate positively with defense spending.
In short, research has consistently found that direct deployments to a hoststate yield results that are consistent with theoretical expectations (that is, for most states, smaller militaries). However, the effects of regional military deployments contradict theoretical expectations, producing the opposite result (that is, larger militaries). We argue that these findings reveal shortcomings in previous works. Specifically, previous studies have failed to consider the interaction between host-state deployments and regional deployments. In the following sections, we develop a theoretical argument that considers how the major power's relationships with third-party states in the same geographic region affect hierarchical relationships between a major power and a subordinate state.
A theory of spatial hierarchy
We base our theoretical argument on previous work concerning security hierarchies by Lake (1999 Lake ( , 2009a Lake ( , 2009b . We assume that sovereignty is fungible; states can enter into relationships where they agree to trade autonomy over some area in exchange for direct or indirect benefits. We argue that the combination of (1) the dyadic relationship between the United States and a given state and (2) the n-adic relationship between the United States and other countries in that state's region jointly explain a state's concessions in exchange for security guarantees. We refer to direct dyadic hierarchical relationships (that is, between the United States and the host-state) as "internal hierarchy", and we refer to the extended regional hierarchical relationships (that is, between the United States and neighboring states) as "external hierarchy."
As in previous studies (see Allen et al. 2014; Lake 2009a ; Martínez Machain and Morgan 2013), we use troop deployments as a proxy for the extent to which the United States offers security to states. We assume that by placing troops in other states, the United States is creating hierarchical relationships with those host-states whereby the host-state cedes autonomy over its foreign policy in exchange for security provided by the United States. We expect larger deployments to correlate with more hierarchical relationships, producing larger autonomy concessions by the host-state. Intuitively this makes sense-if a state gives up autonomy in exchange for security, larger deployments should correlate with an increased likelihood that the United States will become directly involved in disputes that involve the host-state. However, small deployments should also matter. Though they may not engage directly in conflicts involving the host-state, smaller deployments of military trainers and technicians can provide equipment, technology, and expertise to the host-state. Such support may come with conditions that the host-state limit or alter some policies, such as improving its human rights practices (Bell et al. Forthcoming) . We further add that US security relationships with neighboring states condition these concessions.
For present purposes, we simplify internal and external hierarchies into two types: (1) weak or (2) strong. We assume that internal hierarchy is the strongest predictor of that state's decision to cede autonomy. However, the level of external hierarchy conditions the effect of internal hierarchy. We can think of external hierarchy as a constraint on the amount of autonomy that a state is willing to cede to the United States in response to a troop deployment of a given size, as it affects the state's immediate demands for security. Considering hypothetical State A, the amount of autonomy State A cedes to the United States depends on which environment State A finds itself in. Using this framework, there are four environments of influence, as shown in Figure 1 .
The first environment is the most basic. When both internal and external hierarchy are weak, the United States should only exert a small amount of (Brown 2013 (Brown , 2014 Destradi and Gundlach 2013; Frazier and Stewart-Ingersoll 2010; Lake 2009b) . Accordingly, State A should only cede a medium amount of authority when neighborhood deployments are small, since the host-state might want to maintain flexibility in dealing with potentially contentious neighbors.
Where internal and external hierarchy are both strong, State A should sacrifice more autonomy to the United States. Not only is State A in a hierarchical relationship with the United States, but the United States has hierarchical relationships with neighboring states that similarly constrains them. Traditional types of cooperation problems, like the classic security dilemma, begin to evaporate for State A if it and third-party states are under a similar hierarchical relationship (Lake 2009a (Lake , 2009b . The potential for war diminishes when the United States has deployed increasing numbers of troops to each country. If both countries rely upon the United States for security, then the United States becomes the ultimate arbiter between the states. Thus, as internal and external hierarchies strengthen, the likelihood for conflict decreases.
While it is easy to theoretically conceptualize the amount of sovereignty a state cedes to the United States in exchange for security, it is more difficult to quantify it. In this article, we use a state's defense burden (military spending over GDP) to measure this concept. A state's defense burden serves as an indicator of the extent to which states are channeling available resources into the pursuit of international goals. Previous studies have used this as an indicator of foreign policy autonomy, finding that when subordinate states cede foreign policy authority to the United States, they reduce their defense burden and allocate resources to other policy areas in which they exercises more control (Allen et al. 2014) . Hence, we use defense burdens to measure how much a state concedes sovereignty to the United States.
The preceding discussion implies that the extent to which states cede sovereignty to the United States and reduce their defense burdens in response to US military deployments is conditional upon regional factors. In general, we expect increasing internal hierarchy to correlate negatively with host-states' defense burdens. However, the level of external hierarchy moderates this effect. For any given level of internal hierarchy, we expect the negative effect to strengthen as external hierarchy increases. Accordingly, host-states in regions with small neighborhood deployments should decrease their defense burdens in exchange for US troops, but this negative effect should increase in magnitude as neighboring deployments also increase in size.
H1:
The negative effect of host-state troop deployments on defense spending should increase in size as regional deployments increase in size.
Hypothesis 1 represents our most general expectations. However, Allen et al. (2014) have shown that NATO countries behave differently. There are important theoretical and empirical reasons to expect NATO states to behave differently. The United States may use its authority in different ways in regions with high levels of internal and external hierarchy. Theoretically we might think of latent capabilities and need as two factors driving such decisions. Morrow (1991) argues that more symmetric alliances are better able to contribute meaningfully to member states' security. Additionally, allies' proximity to a major military and political rivals may also drive the United States to use its authority to promote greater military spending to deter regional aggressors, as well as alleviate some of the military burden on the United States itself. Since NATO states tended to be closer to the United States in economic and military capabilities than most other friendly states, and because they were geographically proximate to the locus of the Cold War conflict, the defense contributions of NATO members were more likely to make meaningful contributions to US foreign policy goals.
Empirically, contributions to the collective defense have long been a concern among NATO members; previous work has also found that NATO tends to follow the the United States in raising and lowering defense expenditures (Palmer 1990a (Palmer , 1990b . Lake (1999:157) argues that the United States uses its authority over NATO states to ensure that it shares the collective burden. He further argues that the United States put into place institutionalized features of the alliance, like the Annual Review, to help monitor members' efforts to meet spending goals (Lake 1999:158) . If NATO allies do not sufficiently match US contributions to the collective defense, they could have US troops removed from their territory as punishment, thereby depriving individual states of country-specific benefits (that is, direct deployments) (Sandler 1988) . Although the United States could also attempt to force their non-NATO allies to increase their defense burdens, NATO states tend to be larger, more developed, and more powerful states as compared to other US allies and are therefore better able to contribute to European defense. Lake (1999:163-164) , in reference to Pacific Rim states like Japan, the Philippines, and Micronesia, notes that [a] lthough there were an essential part of the Pacific perimeter, they could not contribute resources beyond their bases to the American defense effort. Although Japan was expected to be less of a burden. . . [it] was not expected to contribute to any larger division of labor. In Europe. . . the expectation was quite different.
Accordingly, because NATO states are closer to the United States in terms of latent capabilities, and cluster geographically near the locus of the Cold War conflict, changes in US troop deployments within and around any given NATO state reflects broader increases or decreases in US contributions to NATO. Hence, we expect NATO allies to increase defense spending when the United States deploys troops within their borders. Furthermore, we also expect this positive effect to increase as the number of regional troops increases. relationship with the United States, this situation suggests that the United States already exerts substantial control over State A's policies. When external hierarchy is low, State A may cede some autonomy over its foreign policy but may also wish to retain some flexibility since neighboring states are not similarly subordinate to the United States. That is, the high level of internal hierarchy should lead to a decrease in defense spending, but low level of external hierarchy will curb the effect. As external hierarchy strengthens, this dynamic changes. Since the United States is already providing the host-state security through high levels of troop deployments, increasing deployments to the host-state's neighbors does not diminish the host-state's security vis-à-vis the other states in its neighborhood. With its neighbors increasingly subordinate to the United States, the host-state should be able to lower its defense burden.
Next, consider states that have weak internal hierarchy. As we discussed earlier, conditions of weak internal hierarchy may produce different results depending upon the host-state's relationship with the United States. Let us assume State A has weak internal hierarchy and poor relations with the United States. In this case, State A may respond to increases in regional troop deployments by increasing its own military spending. State A may perceive such increases in regional troop levels as threatening due to its poor relations with the United States. For example, the United States has used military deployments to help contain adversarial states like Russia and China. Now assume State A has weak internal hierarchy but has strong relations with the United States. It is possible for such states to either not respond to or decrease defense spending in response to increases in external hierarchy. Although State A may have weak internal hierarchy itself, it can maintain its defense burden or safely lower it if it wants to when its neighbors are more highly subordinate to the United States. In such cases, an increase in the size of regional US troop deployments may effectively increase State A's security by promoting greater stability within the region. Rather, State A enjoys positive externalities from the increased US presence in the region.
Whether a state has an alliance with the United States should serve as a good indicator of its relationship with the United States and potentially condition how it responds to changes in US troop deployments in its region under conditions of weak internal hierarchy. Non-allies of the United States should be more apt to respond to increases in external hierarchy by increasing defense spending. Alternatively, because they already have security guarantees from the United States, allies of the United States should not feel threatened by increases in regional troop deployments and should feel safer reducing military expenditures in response to such increases. Combined with our initial discussion on the effects of strong internal hierarchy, this discussion produces the following two hypotheses.
H3: The positive effect of regional troop deployments on defense spending is larger in states with a smaller number of US troops than in states with a higher number of US troops. H4: The positive effect of regional troop deployments on defense spending is larger in non-allied states than in allied states.
Following our discussion from the previous section, we expect NATO allies to increase their defense spending in exchange for troops. We expect this condition to hold for regional troops as well. As noted, the proximity of NATO states suggests that increasing regional deployments are indicative of greater US contributions to NATO defense. Hence, as the number of regional troops around NATO allies increase, NATO allies should increase their defense burden to follow US contributions. However, this is still conditional on the number of host-state troops in the NATO state. The more security the United States provides to that state through troops, the more likely that state will respond positively to regional contributions in NATO defense. We argue that this conditionality stems from the high level of internal hierarchy and the US ability to punish the host by removing troops from its territory. For NATO states with large direct deployments and small neighboring deployments, free-riding may be a greater possibility, as the United States cannot credibly relocate those troops to another NATO ally. Large deployments require substantial investments to house troops and store equipment. It is difficult to punish free-riding by removing troops where there are few substitute locations capable of supporting large deployments. Accordingly, these states do not have to increase their defense spending when the United States deploys more troops to their region. Alternatively, the presence of large regional deployments suggests the presence of the requisite infrastructure, thereby making it easier for the United States to punish free-riding by moving troops to neighboring states. Thus, states with large direct and neighborhood deployments should be more likely increase contributions to the collective defense as the credibility of losing deployments is higher, and the likelihood of US threats are greater.
H5: As the number of troops within a NATO ally increases, the positive impact that regional US troop deployments around that state have on the host-state's defense spending increases.
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We provide an alternative test using UN ideal point scores (Bailey, Strezlmev and Voeten 2015) 4 We take the natural log of both variables to adjust for skew and because we have an expectation that there are diminishing returns from deploying soldiers to a country or region.
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We expect ln(Troops) and ln(Troops Spatial Mean) to jointly influence the level of a state's defense burden. To provide preliminary support for our hypotheses, Figure 2 plots our two troop deployment variables against one another in all states, non-NATO allies, NATO allies, and non-US allies, weighting the size of the circles by the size of the state's defense burden. The larger the circles, the larger the defense burden. The results provides some support for our basic hypotheses. In panels 1 and 4, we can see that states with higher levels of regional and direct troop deployments tend to have smaller defense burdens. Panel 2 is less clear, but does suggest the possibility of a similar dynamic. In panel 3 we can see that larger direct and regional troop deployments tend to positively correlate with defense spending in NATO allies, which is what we expect.
Since we expect ln(Troops) and ln(Troops Spatial Mean) to jointly affect defense spending, we construct an interactive measure between the two variables, ln(Troops) × ln(Troops Spatial Mean), to include in our following models.
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The calculation of row-standardized spatial variables (µ it ) is the following:
where w ikt is a dichotomous variable denoting that state k is contiguous to referent state i at time t (Neumayer and Plümper 2016) . Here, w = 1 if country k is within 450km of referent state i, and w = 0 otherwise. x kt represents the value of the given variable (for example, troops) for state k at time t. We identified neighboring countries using the Correlates of War's Direct Contiguity Data (Stinnett, Tir, Schafer, Diehl, and Gochman 2002) (v3.1). We include all states falling within the five-point contiguity categories in calculating our spatial measure. See Ward and Gleditsch (2008) and Neumayer and Plümper (2016) for more on calculating spatial variables.
This interaction allows us to examine how states respond to changes in US troop deployments within their borders given the number of US troops in their region. It also allows us to examine how states respond to changes in regional troop deployments given the number of US troops within their borders. Because our interest is in the conditioning effect of both the host-state and regional measures of troop deployments (that is, X and Z jointly), we present the marginal effects of both variables in the following (Berry, Golder and Milton 2012) .
Our models also include several factors that causally influence military spending. These variables are listed in the summary statistics table (Table 1) and are described more fully in the supplemental online appendix. In the following, we outline three key nonstandard control variables that we include in our analysis and discussion.
First, we expand on Allen et al. (2014) by including controls for factors that US troop deployments may proxy and to capture relevant characteristics of the state's security environment. It is possible that our focus on the spatial effect of US military deployments may proxy the effects of regional alliance relationships. The correlation between troop deployments and whether or not a state is a US ally is reasonably strong (r = 0.51 in the general estimation sample, Model 1). Accordingly, regional deployments may similarly be capturing the regional alliance ties of the United States. To isolate the effect of regional US troop deployments from the effect of regional US alliance ties, we also include a variable, US Allies (Spatial Mean), that measures the proportion of states surrounding the referent state that are US allies. We also expect other elements of the regional security environment to affect military spending and include two additional spatial variables to account for these dynamics. Accordingly, we include a variable, Host-State Allies (Spatial Mean), that measures the proportion of the observed state's neighbors that it is allied with.
6 Lastly, the defense burdens of neighboring states may influence the defense burden of the observed state. Collier and Hoeffler (2002) find that neighborhood defense expenditures positively affect a state's own military spending. Goldsmith (2007) also finds positive correlation between regional spending and states' defense burdens. Since we argue that military deployments affect defense spending, we must be sure that the estimated effect of regional deployments is not biased by the omission of neighboring military expenditures, which those deployments should also affect. We include a Spatial Lag variable to capture the average level of neighboring states' defense burdens.
These spatial variables give us additional explanatory power on how regional troop deployments independently affect defense spending behavior. We derive these measures using alliance data from the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) project (Leeds, Ritter, Mitchell, and Long 2002) and contiguity data from the Correlates of War's Direct Contiguity Data (Stinnett et al. 2002) (v3.0) .
We run four different models using different subsamples, since we have different theoretical expectations for different types of states. To capture our most general expectations, we first run a pooled model that includes all states. Next, we divide the sample into three subsamples: (1) Non-NATO allies of the We limit alliances to offense or defense pacts. The procedure used to calculate these spatial measures is the same as that described in footnote 4.
United States, (2) NATO members, and (3) States that have no alliances ties with the United States. We estimate our models using a Prais-Winsten regression with panel-corrected standard errors and an AR(1) serial correlation structure. 7 We lag all independent variables in the model one time period (t − 1), except for war, civil war, the number of border states, and the moving average of MIDs. Table 1 presents the summary statistics for all variables included in the models.
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Results Table 2 displays the results of the four empirical models. Because we expect ln(Troops) and ln(Troops Spatial Mean) each to exert an effect that is conditional upon the other variable, we use marginal effects graphs to interpret their combined interactive effect on Defense Burden. First we examine the effect of ln(Troops) on Defense Burden across different levels of regional deployment size, displayed in Figure 3 . Each panel number in Figure 3 corresponds to the matching model in Table 2 .
The results generally support Hypothesis 1. First, according to Panel 1 (all countries), when there are few US troops in the region surrounding a host-state (that is, external hierarchy is weak), increasing US troop deployments to the host-state (that is, increasing internal hierarchy) does not have a noticeable effect on the defense spending of that state.
9 However, as the average size of the regional deployments surrounding the host-state increases, US troop deployments to the host-state begin to negatively affect defense spending of that state. The marginal effect shown in Panel 1 of Figure 3 indicates that states reduce their defense burdens in exchange for US troops. At the higher end of regional troop deployments, as the number of US troops within the host-state increases by 1%, the host-state decreases their defense burden by about 0.5 percentage points.
Panel 1 of Figure 3 shows only the most general effects. Panel 2 shows that non-NATO allies do not alter their defense burdens in response to increases in troops deployed to their territory. Panel 3 in Figure 3 shows the results for NATO members. These results provide support for Hypothesis 2. When the average size of regional deployments around NATO allies reaches about 3,000 troops, we see a statistically significant positive effect, indicating that NATO allies increase their defense spending when the United States increases the number of troops within their borders, but only where regional deployments are large. Panel 4 shows that non-allies decrease their defense burdens in Wooldridge's (2010) test of serial correlation indicates the presence of serial correlation in all four subsamples, yielding p ≤ .05 in each case. Visual inspection of the residuals also warrants correcting for serial correlation.
8 Allen et al. (2014) address the possible endogenous relationship between troop deployments and defense spending and find that the effect of troop deployments is consistent under alternative models designed to account for this possibility.
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The difference between the effect in the non-NATO allies sample and the other models may be indistinguishable. See Figure 4 for a comparison of where these effects are different from each other (Gelman and Stern 2006) . response to increases in deployments to their states. As in Model 1, this effect is not distinguishable from zero at low levels of the regional deployment variable. However, this negative effect becomes different from zero when the average regional deployment size approaches approximately 20 troops. Overall, these results provide us with insights into the relationship between US deployments in and around the host-state and how those deployments affect the observed state's defense burdens. First, it appears that non-allies of the United States are driving the results from Model 1. Panels 2 and 3 yield null and positive marginal effects respectively. Only in the non-allied sample do states appear to respond to increasing internal US military deployments by decreasing their own defense spending. Furthermore, this effect is only significant once we have passed a minimal level of US troops deployed throughout the neighboring region. Though this value (that is, 20) may seem small, it is important to remember that this is an average. The mean neighborhood size is approximately six states. In some cases the United States may have stronger relationships with two to three states, meaning that some neighboring states are hosting larger deployments, while others may be hosting small deployments. These results suggest that alliance agreements between the United States and a host-state also condition how the host-state responds to deployments. Existing alliance ties suggest that the United States has already established a hierarchical relationship with the host-state and may already be offering physical or economic security in exchange for influence over foreign policy decision making in the host-state. Hence, the host-state may be less willing to give up additional sovereignty in exchange for troops. This may explain the lack of an effect for the non-NATO ally sample (Model 2). On the other hand, non-allies do not have an existing security relationship with the United States, so the presence of US troops within their state may be the only avenue by which the United States is establishing a security relationship with the host-state. Since the host-state did not previously concede sovereignty over foreign policy to the United States through an alliance agreement, the host-state may be willing and able to give up more sovereignty (that is, reduce their defense burden) in exchange for troops. Next, we examine the effect of ln(Troops Spatial Mean) on Defense Burden, given the size of host-state deployment. The results shown in Figure 4 provide support for Hypothesis 3 and the role of external hierarchies, especially in regard to the nonally model. Panel 1 shows the results for the most general model (Model 1). Here we can see that when the US troop presence within a state is small or nonexistent, the marginal effect of an increase in the average size of regional US deployments correlates with an increase in the state's defense burden. In other words, when a low degree of internal hierarchy characterizes the relationship between the United States and the observed state, that state will respond to increases in the regional military presence of the United States by increasing its own defense expenditures.
The results for non-allied states (Panel 4) and non-NATO allies (Panel 2) also provide support for Hypothesis 4, indicating that a state's relationship with the United States will condition how it responds to increases in regional deployment levels. Specifically, non-allied states hosting small deployments increase defense burdens as the neighborhood US troop presence increases in size. Once a non-allied state hosts a larger deployment (≥ 20,000), we see a null effect. Alternatively, Panel 2 shows us that regardless of how many US troops a non-NATO ally hosts, non-NATO allies do not change their defense spending in relation to the number of US troops in their region. As per the discussion preceding Hypothesis 4, it is possible that the null result here reflects that non-NATO allies do not view regional US troop deployments as a threat due to their alliance with the United States.
The results from Panel 3 of Figure 4 provides support for Hypothesis 5. When a NATO ally hosts more than approximately 1,100 US troops, it increases its defense burden when the United States increases the size of regional deployments. This increase in spending likely reflects the emphasis NATO states have placed on burden sharing. In the context of NATO, a general increase in the size of US deployments to the region surrounding the host-state reflects a broad-based increase in the contributions of the United States to NATO's security and manpower. Although not all US military personnel may be directly attached to NATO, its member states still benefit from the security provided by a larger US military presence. To put it differently, the bureaucratic organization of these troops is somewhat separate from the practical effects of their presence in or around a particular state. More generally, the results from Figure 4 further illustrate that the nature of alliance and hierarchcical relationships condition the influence of US troop deployments.
Some cases can help to illustrate these dynamics. After the 1979 peace treaty with Israel, US military deployments to Egypt (a non-ally) increased from 136 in 1979 to over 1,000 in 1982, where it generally remained through the 1990s. Regional deployments were consistently above 800 during this time period. Despite a growing economy, Egypt's defense burden fell from a normal range of 3.5%-4.5% to just over 1% during the 1990s. Though the end of the Cold War may partially explain this decline, Egypt maintained a defense burden of only 1.02% in the First Gulf War; this level is actually lower than its burdens in the surrounding years. Alternatively, US deployments in and around Great Britain track the latter's defense burden quite closely. Great Britain's defense burden rises along with both direct and regional troop deployments in the 1950s, both types decline through the early 1960s, and increase slightly from the 1970s through the end of the Cold War, with only a brief spike in the defense burden during 1980. All other factors (that is, alliance status, war, civil war, MID involvement, and threat environment) are more or less constant for both cases over these time periods.
Figure 5 provides insight into how direct and regional deployments affect host-state defense burdens. The X and Y axes show the range of the troops and spatial troops variables respectively, while the darker shading indicates higher predicted defense burdens and the lighter shading indicates lower predicted defense burdens from our model general model (Model 1). It appears that the graph gets darker as the number of regional troops increases and lighter as the number of direct deployments increases, implying that higher regional deployments lead to higher defense spending and higher direct deployments lead to lower defense spending. Additionally, we can see that at low levels of direct deployments, increases in the average regional troop deployment size leads to an increase in the magnitude of the state's defense burden. However, as we increase the size of the referent state's troop deployment, increases in regional deployments correlate with smaller increases in defense burden and ultimately no increase at the highest levels of the referent state's deployment size. Alternatively, for any given level of regional deployments, increasing the size of the deployment to the referent state generally correlates with a decrease in the predicted defense burden. However, this effect is much more pronounced for larger regional deployments than it is for smaller regional deployments. For example, when ln (TroopsSpatialMean) = 5, we see a decline from 3%-4% to 1%-2% in the host-state's defense burden when we increase ln(Troops) from 0 to 13. However, when ln(TroopsSpatialMean) = 10, a similar increase in direct deployments reduces defense burdens from 7%-8% to 1%-2%. Though such shifts are extreme, they help illustrate the conditional impact that direct and regional deployments have on host-state defense burdens.
We have run several robustness checks to determine if the end of the Cold War has impacted these relationships. Our results are all consistent throughout the Cold War period (see supplemental appendix, Tables A2 and A3 and Figures A3-A8 ). In addition, only one of the post-Cold War models changed. The effects of host-state deployments in the nonally sample cease to be statistically significant in the post-Cold War period. Though beyond the scope of our present analysis, the fact that the end of the Cold War did not result in a clear change in how states responded to US military deployments suggests that other factors were at play.
12
Importantly, these results hold when we control for other regional security factors. Figure 6 displays a coefficient plot for the spatial lag variable (Panel 1), as well as the spatial alliance measures (Panel 2). The spatial lag is positive and statistically significant across all four models, suggesting that states respond to increasing levels of military spending within the neighboring region by increasing their own spending. However, the magnitude of this effect varies substantially across the four samples. NATO and non-NATO allies of the United States do respond to increases in regional defense expenditures by increasing their own, but this effect is small compared to non-allies of the United States. Indeed, there is a large and statistically significant difference in the magnitude of this effect between the allied and non-allied samples. This may reflect that non-allies of the US do not have receive security "subsidies" through any sort of relationship with the United States, making their own security provision efforts all the more important.
The spatial alliance variables shown in Panel 2 of Figure 6 are effectively proportional measures indicating how many states in the referent state's neighborhood are allies-either of the referent state itself, or of the United States. Given their similar construction and that they measure similar concepts, comparisons between the two are informative. Splitting the samples in Models 2-4 is akin to interacting the alliance status of a state with the spatial alliance indicator, providing additional nuance to these variables.
The spatial alliance variable for the referent state positively correlates with defense burdens in the pooled sample (Model 1), the NATO sample (Model 3), and the non-allies sample (Model 4). This variable produces a null result in the non-NATO ally sample (Model 2). The positive coefficients in Models 1, 3, and 4 are surprising. States with more allies in their neighborhood appear to spend more on defense. We might think these states should spend less since the higher concentration of allies suggests that the amount of spending required to produce the same level of security should be less, all else being equal. However, such states may both spend more, and form more regional alliances, because of some sort of security threat. However, we control for a range of other variables that should capture such active and latent security pressures, and so this appears to be the independent effect of regional alliance ties. Thus, it is not clear what leads to these positive effects.
The spatial US allies variable also produces interesting results. Models 1 and 4 yield statistically significant negative coefficients. Non-allies appear to decrease defense spending as they find themselves surrounded by more US allies. The results from the pooled sample likely reflect the influence of these non-allied states in the estimation sample. Alternatively, we again see a null result for non-NATO allies of the United States. Lastly, NATO states increase their defense burdens as proportionately more allies of the United States surround them. The results for the non-NATO ally model match the logic of our primary variables and mirror the marginal effects discussed earlier. Given NATO's geographic concentration, the positive coefficient for NATO states in both models may similarly reflect burden-sharing pressures. The null results for the non-NATO ally sample may reflect the idea that the referent state benefits from direct security guarantees, and so broader regional alliance patterns perhaps affect these states' defense burdens less clearly. The negative coefficient for non-allied states is less clear. We might think that non-allied states should respond to increasing regional security ties with the United States by increasing their own defense expenditures. However, for some states, increasing homogeneity in their neighborhood may indicate greater stability and less need to increase defense spending. Though we often think of states like China and Russia, most non-allied states of the United States are not likely to possess the economic or military capabilities to meaningfully challenge US leadership in a region. The states included in the non-allied sample exhibit substantial variation in geographic location and economic development. Accordingly, a handful of outliers do not drive this negative result. Ultimately, more research will be required to better understand how overlapping patterns in spatial alliance ties influence how states respond to both the US military presence as well as security concerns posed by neighboring states.
Conclusions
Our results provide strong support for our hypotheses, indicating that the influence of US troop deployments on host-state defense spending is conditional upon the broader regional context of those deployments. Most states will not decrease their defense burdens in exchange for more US troops if internal hierarchy is strong but external hierarchy is weak. However, as external hierarchy increases in size, the host-state will decrease its defense burden in exchange for more troops. While these relationships hold in the pooled sample, they tend to characterize non-allied states of the United States. We find no evidence that non-NATO allies respond to changes in direct US military deployments. Alternatively, we do find that NATO allies respond in the hypothesized manner by increasing their defense expenditures in response to increases in the size of host-state troop deployments. These effects only hold, however, when neighboring states also host a large number of US troops.
The findings also provide insights into how hosting US troops conditions a state's response to US deployments in the surrounding region. In our general model, we find that for states where internal hierarchy is weak, they respond to increases in external hierarchy by increasing their own defense burdens. However, when internal hierarchy increases, this positive effect eventually disappears. As with the conditioning effect of regional deployments, the conditioning effect of host-state deployments is clearest for the non-allied subsample. This indicates that these states do not share formal alliance ties with the United States and tend to be more wary of regional power buildups, since the deployment of US military forces alone does not necessarily come with explicit guarantees in the conditions under which the United States will aid in securing the nonally. Alternatively, we find no evidence of an effect for non-NATO allies. We take this as further evidence that the security guarantees embodied by an alliance agreement greatly augment host-states' responses to US troop deployments. We also find that NATO members increase their defense spending in response to regional troop buildups, but only once the state itself hosts a moderate number of US military forces. Member states that host a large number of US troops respond to regional increases in US troop deployments by increasing their own defense burden. We take this as confirming the idea that NATO states tend to follow the lead of the United States in defense spending. In this case, increasing deployments is indicative of increasing US contributions to the NATO alliance more broadly, thereby prompting host-states to increase their own contributions. This supports the idea put forward by Lake (1999) , who argues that the United States used its authority over NATO member states in fundamentally different ways as compared to other allied states.
Our findings have broader theoretical and conceptual implications. Existing work on hierarchy and contractual security relationships approach the subject through a dyadic framework, divorced from broader regional context. As scholars of regional security have noted, relations between a state and major powers constitute only a part of a state's security concerns (Frazier and Stewart-Ingersoll 2010) . Drawing on theoretical insights from both theories of hierarchy and theories of regional security relationships, our analysis has demonstrated that regional context matters in shaping how major powers like the United States can use the provision of security to elicit policy concessions from states. States hosting US troop deployments do not lower their defense burdens unconditionally. US security relationships in the broader region create an environment of mutually reinforcing hierarchical relationships, wherein individual states are more responsive to the United States as its broader regional influence grows. Future research should seek to develop improved theoretical and empirical approaches to understanding why the United States chooses to use its authority in such areas differently, as in the case of NATO.
Similarly, researchers should examine how troop deployments by rival powers influence the dynamics explored herein, as these models of internal and external hierarchy are isolated from competitor attempts to create their own hierarchies abroad. A ripe area for further exploration is to examine non-US troop deployments as rising (and declining) major powers create similar relationships in regions. While controlling for Warsaw Pact countries does not affect our findings, 13 including Soviet troop deployments during the Cold War would add robustness to both the theoretical concepts we employ here and the empirical tests of those arguments. The deployment of Soviet forces to a region may dampen the effects of US military deployments, or may lead the United States to use its authority over a state to promote higher levels of defense spending.
These findings are important for current foreign policy developments as the United States considers reducing and reallocating its foreign commitments abroad. Targeting specific countries for reductions will have dramatically different results than if the United States pursued broad, regional reductions. Targeting states for deployment reductions may encourage the targeted state to spend more on their own military if the region already has a heavy US presence. However, reducing regional or targeted commitments to NATO countries may result in a reduction of defense commitments by both the state receiving the cuts as well as its neighbors.
